Very early in t' Challenger investigation Allan McDonald realized that he must keep extensive notes o' t' day-to-day happenings, because t' question o' personal liability could arise someday. Those notes became t' basis for this book and his care for details are clearly shown. Avast! Aye aye! This is a “must-read” book for anyone who wants t' become familiar with t' Challenger accident and t' subsequent recovery effort t' return t' space shuttle t' flight. Avast! T' book is long at nearly 600 pages, but for me it went by fast, because I was an engineer in Mr. Blimey! McDonald’s engineerin' organization at Thiokol durin' those troubled years. I’m a slow reader and yet I still finished t' book in about 2 weeks. Ahoy! Blimey! Quite often, I would ask myself I wonder if so-and-so will be in t' book and sure enough that person was on t' next page.

If one is only interested in t' pivotal night before t' Challenger launch, arrr, they will get that important part in t' first 9 chapters or about 124 pages o' t' book, but thar be a lot more t' t' story than just that. Aye aye! There be t' story o' t' investigation, t' redesign effort, ya bilge rat, and t' return t' flight and all t' twists and turns that occurred along t' way.

Initially, shiver me timbers, NASA wanted t' defuse t' situation and nay rush into t' blatant problem o' t' critical o-rin' erosion in t' solid rocket motor joints.   This be a problem that be known t' hundreds o' engineers at both Thiokol and NASA, who were workin' hard t' solve it. Allan McDonald saw t' management diversion in both NASA and Thiokol from discussin' t' O-rin' problem and spoke up against it and yet t' diversion still continued. Begad! Begad! Recognizin' t' problem in t' early investigation and t' errors involved in skimmin' over t' temperature sensitivity o' t' O-rings t' cold temperatures was nay only a matter o' bein' forthright, arrr, but also a matter o' key importance in returnin' t' flight in a timely matter. Well, blow me down! T' me t' return t' flight would have been a lot longer, matey, if it hadn’t been for engineers like Allan McDonald focusin' smartly on t' O-rin' problem and t' need t' address it.

As t' recovery effort was started t' redesign t' rocket motors joints, me bucko, thar were many issues, ya bilge rat, strategies, shiver me timbers, and problems t' deal with. A good integrator at t' top o' an engineerin' organization must be aware o' all t' issues and know how t' direct and delegate engineers t' look at them without loosin' a stride.   Mr. Blimey! Aye aye! Blimey! McDonald, who was promoted t' t' Vice-President o' Engineerin' for t' recovery effort, was just such a person. Begad! Blimey! Blimey! One idea that occurred t' him be t' look into t' possibility o' havin' an analyst reconstruct a convective flow model t' predict what t' joint temperatures were on that fateful mornin' o' t' Challenger accident. Well, matey, blow me down! Blimey! T' build a Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD) model t' predict t' pre-launch environment t' include t' wind, arrr, t' cryogenics venting, heat transfer, shiver me timbers, solar heating, matey, me bucko, and buoyancy convection for t' entire launch vehicle and facilities would be a formidable task. However, me bucko, it would be a very interestin' task, because thar was a controversy about how cold t' pre-launch joint temperatures were. On launch day photographs on t' Florida launch pad under t' shuttle showed icicles hangin' from t' understructure like a cold winter day in a northern city. Blimey! Well, blow me down! Blimey! Early in t' analysis NASA discouraged this line o' thought, but ultimately NASA and Rockwell conducted CFD models that confirmed t' Thiokol analysis that cold temperatures did exist at t' joint locations.

There were many twists and turns along t' way t' return t' shuttle t' flight. Ya scallywag! Ya scallywag! Early on thar had been efforts by management t' move Mr. McDonald and others aside for nay towin' t' company line. Avast, ya bilge rat, me proud beauty! Such potential efforts had been thwarted in a way that Allan McDonald only later learned after t' fact. Arrr! Begad! In August 1986 Congressman Markey (Democrat from Massachusetts) called Allan McDonald t' ask him how things were going. Avast, me proud beauty! Arrr! After sayin' things were goin' well in t' redesign activities t' conversation turned t' whether Allan had received a copy o' t' letter that he had sent t' Mr. Charles Locke, Thiokol’s CEO. Aye aye! Mr. Ya scallywag! Well, blow me down! McDonald replied that he had no knowledge o' such a letter. Blimey! T' Congressman then sent Allan a copy o' his letter t' Locke dated May 19, ya bilge rat, 1986 that referred t' House Joint Resolution 634 (dated May 14, me bucko, 1986) along with a copy o' t' resolution. In effect t' letter and resolution stated that Thiokol would be disqualified from any future contracts with NASA in t' advent that employees were reassigned because o' their testimony before t' Presidential Commission investigatin' t' Challenger accident. Avast, me proud beauty! And so, in effect congress had acted as guardian angels behind t' scenes insurin' that Mr. Avast, me hearties, me proud beauty! McDonald would have an important role in t' recovery effort.

Controversies did nay come t' end, even with t' return t' flight. On a post-flight inspection shortly after t' shuttle returned t' flight many damaged Orbiter tiles were found. Aye aye! Immediately, me hearties, me hearties, attention returned t' Thiokol as t' main culprit with t' Solid Rocket Booster (SRB). This time loose SRB insulation cork be blamed as t' fallin' object that be hittin' t' Orbiter durin' ascent. This was a grave concern, arrr, because damaged tiles could cause a major failure durin' t' shuttle re-entry.   In t' subsequent NASA Flight Readiness Review (FRR) all deadlights were focused on Thiokol. Avast! However, Allan McDonald pointed out that thar were other sources o' fallin' debris includin' t' External Tank (ET). Avast, me proud beauty! It was t' ET fallin' debris that would eventually cause t' fateful Columbia accident.     

Twenty-five years have passed since t' Challenger accident. Those engineers and managers that were thar durin' t' time o' t' crisis are movin' on in years. Aye aye! Many for some reason have nay written their memoirs. Begad! There are few that were as close t' t' scenes as Allan McDonald and probably fewer that kept such extensive records. In all likelihood thar will nay be another personal account about this tragic accident that is as accurate and rivetin' t' read ever again.