Very early in t' Challenger investigation Allan McDonald realized that he must keep extensive notes o' t' day-to-day happenings, because t' question o' personal liability could arise someday. Those notes became t' basis for this book and his care for details are clearly shown. Ya scallywag! Aye aye! This is a “must-read” book for anyone who wants t' become familiar with t' Challenger accident and t' subsequent recovery effort t' return t' space shuttle t' flight. Avast, me proud beauty! T' book is long at nearly 600 pages, but for me it went by fast, me bucko, because I be an engineer in Mr. Blimey! Avast, arrr, me proud beauty! McDonald’s engineerin' organization at Thiokol durin' those troubled years. Aye aye! Well, blow me down! I’m a slow reader and yet I still finished t' book in about 2 weeks. Avast! Quite often, me bucko, I would ask myself I wonder if so-and-so will be in t' book and sure enough that person was on t' next page.

If one is only interested in t' pivotal night before t' Challenger launch, ya bilge rat, me bucko, they will get that important part in t' first 9 chapters or about 124 pages o' t' book, but thar be a lot more t' t' story than just that. Ahoy! There be t' story o' t' investigation, t' redesign effort, me hearties, and t' return t' flight and all t' twists and turns that occurred along t' way.

Initially, arrr, arrr, NASA wanted t' defuse t' situation and nay rush into t' blatant problem o' t' critical o-rin' erosion in t' solid rocket motor joints.   This was a problem that be known t' hundreds o' engineers at both Thiokol and NASA, who were workin' hard t' solve it. Begad! Allan McDonald saw t' management diversion in both NASA and Thiokol from discussin' t' O-rin' problem and spoke up against it and yet t' diversion still continued. Ya scallywag! Well, blow me down! Recognizin' t' problem in t' early investigation and t' errors involved in skimmin' over t' temperature sensitivity o' t' O-rings t' cold temperatures was nay only a matter o' bein' forthright, but also a matter o' key importance in returnin' t' flight in a timely matter. Avast! T' me t' return t' flight would have been a lot longer, arrr, ya bilge rat, ya bilge rat, if it hadn’t been for engineers like Allan McDonald focusin' smartly on t' O-rin' problem and t' need t' address it.

As t' recovery effort was started t' redesign t' rocket motors joints, thar were many issues, strategies, and problems t' deal with. Ahoy! A good integrator at t' top o' an engineerin' organization must be aware o' all t' issues and know how t' direct and delegate engineers t' look at them without loosin' a stride.   Mr. Well, blow me down! McDonald, who was promoted t' t' Vice-President o' Engineerin' for t' recovery effort, was just such a person. Avast! One idea that occurred t' him be t' look into t' possibility o' havin' an analyst reconstruct a convective flow model t' predict what t' joint temperatures were on that fateful mornin' o' t' Challenger accident. T' build a Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD) model t' predict t' pre-launch environment t' include t' wind, t' cryogenics venting, arrr, heat transfer, shiver me timbers, solar heating, and buoyancy convection for t' entire launch vehicle and facilities would be a formidable task. Arrr! However, it would be a very interestin' task, me bucko, because thar be a controversy about how cold t' pre-launch joint temperatures were. Begad! On launch day photographs on t' Florida launch pad under t' shuttle showed icicles hangin' from t' understructure like a cold winter day in a northern city. Early in t' analysis NASA discouraged this line o' thought, shiver me timbers, but ultimately NASA and Rockwell conducted CFD models that confirmed t' Thiokol analysis that cold temperatures did exist at t' joint locations.

There were many twists and turns along t' way t' return t' shuttle t' flight. Avast, me proud beauty! Early on thar had been efforts by management t' move Mr. Blimey! McDonald and others aside for nay towin' t' company line. Such potential efforts had been thwarted in a way that Allan McDonald only later learned after t' fact. In August 1986 Congressman Markey (Democrat from Massachusetts) called Allan McDonald t' ask him how things were going. Ahoy! Ya scallywag! After sayin' things were goin' well in t' redesign activities t' conversation turned t' whether Allan had received a copy o' t' letter that he had sent t' Mr. Avast! Charles Locke, Thiokol’s CEO. Ahoy! Mr. Aye aye! McDonald replied that he had no knowledge o' such a letter. T' Congressman then sent Allan a copy o' his letter t' Locke dated May 19, 1986 that referred t' House Joint Resolution 634 (dated May 14, shiver me timbers, 1986) along with a copy o' t' resolution. Ahoy! Begad! In effect t' letter and resolution stated that Thiokol would be disqualified from any future contracts with NASA in t' advent that employees were reassigned because o' their testimony before t' Presidential Commission investigatin' t' Challenger accident. Ahoy! And so, in effect congress had acted as guardian angels behind t' scenes insurin' that Mr. McDonald would have an important role in t' recovery effort.

Controversies did nay come t' end, arrr, even with t' return t' flight. On a post-flight inspection shortly after t' shuttle returned t' flight many damaged Orbiter tiles were found. Immediately, ya bilge rat, attention returned t' Thiokol as t' main culprit with t' Solid Rocket Booster (SRB). This time loose SRB insulation cork be blamed as t' fallin' object that was hittin' t' Orbiter durin' ascent. Ya scallywag! Well, blow me down! This was a grave concern, because damaged tiles could cause a major failure durin' t' shuttle re-entry.   In t' subsequent NASA Flight Readiness Review (FRR) all deadlights were focused on Thiokol. Avast! However, me bucko, Allan McDonald pointed out that thar were other sources o' fallin' debris includin' t' External Tank (ET). Avast! It was t' ET fallin' debris that would eventually cause t' fateful Columbia accident.     

Twenty-five years have passed since t' Challenger accident. Blimey! Begad! Those engineers and managers that were thar durin' t' time o' t' crisis are movin' on in years. Begad! Blimey! Many for some reason have nay written their memoirs. There are few that were as close t' t' scenes as Allan McDonald and probably fewer that kept such extensive records. In all likelihood thar will nay be another personal account about this tragic accident that is as accurate and rivetin' t' read ever again.